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24 January 1962

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Copy No. *LD-6*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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
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USSR: Moscow appears to be going to some lengths to explain its reasons for spending additional time in its efforts to negotiate a Berlin solution with the Western powers. A public lecturer in Moscow on 21 January, in discussing some details of the Thompson-Gromyko talks, stated flatly that solution of the West Berlin problem by negotiations is clearly preferable to unilateral conclusion of an East German peace treaty. Public lecturers are often used by the government to explain its current policies. Without commenting directly on the prospects for a successful result, the lecturer stated that the talks in Moscow could "hardly succeed" until Washington forced Bonn and Paris into agreement on negotiations. In contrast to Khrushchev's 9 December public rejection of an international authority to govern West Berlin's access routes, the lecturer mentioned without comment that this proposal was one of the "major points" raised by the ambassador. The speaker's indication of Soviet preference for continued negotiations on Berlin follows up the vigorous Pravda attack on 17 January on the opponents of peaceful coexistence. Pravda made a special point of defending the value of Khrushchev's efforts to maintain contacts with Western statesmen by trips abroad, including his visit to the US. Soviet officials in Bonn are spreading the idea that Khrushchev might respond favorably to an invitation to visit Bonn.

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West Germany:

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Adenauer is reported to have expressed "deep suspicion" about the current Berlin talks in Moscow. He said that his information from Washington and Moscow indicated that the US was willing to make concessions. Adenauer fears he may be placed in the difficult position of being ordered to withdraw Federal Republic organizations from Berlin. Such action, he feels, would seriously affect US-German relations and encourage unfavorable internal German political developments. Adenauer said he was reluctant

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[redacted] under the circumstances to commit additional federal economic resources in Berlin or to send German officials and their families to the city. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Iran: Demonstrations in Iran have continued into the third day, with the leftist antigovernment National Front calling for a general strike in the hope of bringing down the government of Prime Minister Amini. Demonstrations have also spread to the University at Shiraz, about 500 miles south of Tehran. The National Front apparently had not expected the demonstrations to lead to violence but has now decided to exploit the [redacted]

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situation. National Front leaders have had no time to prepare for the strike, however, and are apparently depending on the growth of popular sentiment for its success.

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*Jordan: King Husayn is expected to reorganize the Jordanian Government soon with Wasfi Tal, Jordan's ambassador to Iraq, as prime minister. The King hopes the appointment of the 43-year-old Tal will counter mounting criticism of the present government and facilitate the adoption of governmental reforms. However, Tal's inexperience and the probability of opposition from the political enemies he has made in the past suggest he may have serious difficulty. He is unlikely to be able to halt the kingdom's drift toward increasing diplomatic isolation in the Arab world.

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
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*Western Europe: Prospects for an accord on political ties among the six Common Market (EEC) countries have been clouded further by French submission on 18 January of a new draft treaty even less acceptable to the other EEC countries than the French draft of last October. The new draft-- personally drawn up by De Gaulle--fails to take into account the amendments proposed by the other countries in recent weeks. Consequently it does not provide that defense policies of the Six would be reached in common with NATO. Moreover, the proposed new organization would discuss economic matters and hence could review EEC decisions, a provision to which

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[redacted] the other countries are strongly opposed. Representatives of the EEC countries are scheduled to resume talks on the treaty on 25 January. In the meantime, the chief French delegate is attempting to persuade De Gaulle that his new plan stands little chance of acceptance. [redacted]

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Imminent Change in Jordanian Government

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King Husayn, aware of the government's deteriorating prestige and its general lack of effectiveness, has lost confidence in Talhuni, but has found no completely acceptable replacement. His decision to turn to Wasfi Tal appears to have been a reluctant one, dictated by the need to change the government. Tal's mission will be to implement administrative reforms and improve the general efficiency of government machinery. He reportedly has been given a free hand in selecting the projected new cabinet and is tending toward young, capable senior civil servants--a move which would be consistent with the King's desire for a competent "new look" government. Tal's aggressiveness and inclination to speak his own mind--he is one of the few Jordanians who has had the courage to differ with the King when he believed the latter to be wrong--suggest that he will be more independent than Talhuni was in exercising the powers of the prime minister.

Tal is a graduate of the American University of Beirut and was an officer in the British Army in Palestine during World War II. He is generally credited with having been the most trusted adviser of the late Prime Minister Hazza Majalli, Talhuni's predecessor. Subsequent to Majalli's assassination in August 1960, Tal was involved in a conspiracy to remove Talhuni. Tal's appointment as Jordanian ambassador to Iraq in December 1960 was part of Talhuni's maneuvering to break up this conspiracy and to remove Tal from

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his post as acting director of National Guidance, a position which gave him regular and frequent access to the King.

At the time, Tal, who was concurrently director of the government's broadcasting service, was generally regarded as the chief proponent of Jordan's vigorous propaganda warfare with the UAR. In Baghdad, he antagonized the Iraqis by associating with anti-Qasim elements who seek Husayn's patronage. Since Tal also has been linked with Jordanian machinations in Lebanon and Syria, his appointment as prime minister seems unlikely to effect any improvement in Jordan's worsening relations with its Arab neighbors.

Since Syria's withdrawal from the UAR, Nasir has renewed and intensified his campaign against what he refers to as "reactionary" elements in the Arab world and "imperialist stooges such as Husayn." Syria's defection, on the other hand, did not result in the close Syrian-Jordanian relations Husayn rather ineptly sought to promote; Damascus has been cool toward Amman's overtures regarding political and economic relations. Jordanian-Iraqi relations, meanwhile, are foundering over Kuwait. The Iraqi ambassador to Amman was recalled after Husayn received the credentials of the new Kuwaiti ambassador. The Lebanese still suspect Jordanian complicity in the abortive coup of 31 December, and Lebanese security forces are keeping the Jordanian Embassy in Beirut under close surveillance. One of Wasfi Tal's first tasks as prime minister may well be to decide how and whether to react more vigorously to Lebanon's accusations and alleged violations of Jordanian diplomatic immunity.

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